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Abstract
Fragile states are home to a sixth of the world’s population, and their populations are particularly vulnerable to
infectious disease outbreaks. Timely surveillance and control are essential to minimise the impact of these
outbreaks, but little evidence is published about the effectiveness of existing surveillance systems. We did a
systematic review of the circumstances (mode) of detection of outbreaks occurring in 22 fragile states in the
decade 2000-2010 (i.e. all states consistently meeting fragility criteria during the timeframe of the review), as well
as time lags from onset to detection of these outbreaks, and from detection to further events in their timeline. The
aim of this review was to enhance the evidence base for implementing infectious disease surveillance in these
complex, resource-constrained settings, and to assess the relative importance of different routes whereby outbreak
detection occurs.
We identified 61 reports concerning 38 outbreaks. Twenty of these were detected by existing surveillance systems,
but 10 detections occurred following formal notifications by participating health facilities rather than data analysis.
A further 15 outbreaks were detected by informal notifications, including rumours.
There were long delays from onset to detection (median 29 days) and from detection to further events
(investigation, confirmation, declaration, control). Existing surveillance systems yielded the shortest detection delays
when linked to reduced barriers to health care and frequent analysis and reporting of incidence data.
Epidemic surveillance and control appear to be insufficiently timely in fragile states, and need to be strengthened.
Greater reliance on formal and informal notifications is warranted. Outbreak reports should be more standardised
and enable monitoring of surveillance systems’ effectiveness.
Introduction
The World Bank describes a fragile state as a country
‘facing particularly severe development challenges such
as weak institutional capacity, poor governance, political
instability, and frequently ongoing violence or the legacy
effects of past severe conflict’ [1].
In 2009, 29 countries were considered fragile, com-
prising a sixth of the world’s population [2,3]. Fragile
states generally feature poor health indicators, high mal-
nutrition prevalence, scarcity of skilled health workers
and worsening rates of extreme poverty [4-6]. Their
populations are also highly vulnerable to infectious dis-
ease outbreaks, a reflection of inadequate government
services and armed conflict-related phenomena such as
forced displacement [7]. It has been suggested that most
major epidemics worldwide occur in complex emer-
gency and/or natural disaster settings [8].
Detection and early containment of outbreaks in these
settings is also challenging, as highlighted by the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative’s recent setbacks in several
fragile states, where genetic analysis has demonstrated
previously undetected poliovirus transmission of one
year or more duration [9]. Given the intensity of polio
surveillance compared to other epidemic detection sys-
tems, it is plausible that many other disease outbreaks
are detected late or not at all in these same settings.
The importance of epidemic surveillance is recognised,
but there is a scarcity of evidence on optimal ways to
detect outbreaks in the unique situations of fragile
states, where routine health information systems are
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tured surveillance, such as training, sample transport
and data transmission, very constrained. It has been sug-
gested, at least for early warning systems in humanitar-
ian emergencies, that emphasis should be placed on
detecting alerts from health facilities or other informal
sources (e.g. community informants and the media),
rather than on analysis of weekly or other surveillance
data, which often feature low completeness and timeli-
ness, or high background noise due to non-specific case
definitions [10]. So as to contribute to the evidence
basis, we carried out a review of how outbreaks have
been detected in 22 states that consistently met defini-
tions of fragility over the past decade, and of the timeli-
ness of alert and response processes.
Methods
A systematic review of the published literature was per-
formed to identify reports describing infectious disease
outbreaks which began after 31
st December 1999, within
a predefined list of fragile states. The list of fragile states
was created using the World Bank’s quantitative defini-
tion, taking into account both the eligibility of a country
to receive an interest-free International Development
A s s o c i a t i o nl o a na n dan a t i o n ’s Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment score [11]. Countries which
met this definition for at least ten out of eleven years
from the year 2000 to 2010 (see Additional File 1) were
included in this study [2,12-15]. The final list of fragile
states included in the review comprised Afghanistan,
Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gui-
nea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, the Repub-
lic of the Congo, Sao Tome et Principe, Sierra Leone,
the Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-
Leste, Togo and Zimbabwe.
Between 28
th July 2010 and 23
rd August 2010, a com-
bined OVID SP search of the MEDLINE, EMBASE and
Global Health databases was done. OVID SP is a search
engine that taps into various literature databases rele-
vant for global health. MEDLINE is a database of life
sciences and biomedical journals. EMBASE is similar to
MEDLINE but focuses on drug therapeutic studies. Glo-
bal Health focuses on public health and medical science
and includes conference abstracts, thesis reports, elec-
tronic information and other hard to find material. The
basic search concepts were ‘(fragile state of interest)
AND (epidemic-prone event) AND (detection)’. Each
concept was expanded and variations of terms, including
contemporary and historic, French and Spanish were
included (see Additional File 1). Limitations applied
were ‘from 2000 to present’ and ‘humans’.
Outbreak descriptions were excluded from the search
if they primarily involved foreign military forces, or if
the disease of interest was HIV or poliomyelitis, due to
the specific nature of surveillance for these two diseases.
Reports were included in the review if the circum-
stances of initial detection of the outbreak were
reported; and/or if the time from onset to detection of
the outbreak (determined using the definition in Table
1) could be calculated. Whenever this information was
not clear based on the published report, we emailed the
corresponding author once so as to solicit the missing
information. We excluded the report if authors did not
reply or could not provide the information requested.
For each eligible outbreak, the mode of detection was
categorised into (i) data analysis if an existing surveil-
lance system detected the outbreak by noticing a tem-
poral increase in aggregate incidence, either above a
pre-determined threshold or at levels considered unu-
sual compared to the baseline; (ii) formal notification if
the initial alert was raised by health workers as part of
an ongoing surveillance system; and (iii) informal notifi-
cation if the alert was raised through mechanisms other
than an existing surveillance system, either by health
workers or other community members. Both authors
made this classification independently and came to a
consensus decision on any discrepant choices.
Whenever available, we also calculated time lags from
detection or onset to further events in the outbreak
timeline, as per the definitions in Table 1.
Results
Search strategy results
Of the 2634 abstracts produced by the search strategy,
58 reports describing 38 separate outbreaks were
found eligible (Figure 1), of which 35 contained infor-
mation about mode of detection and 24 about time
from onset to detection and/or from detection to
further events. Eleven outbreaks occurred in Sudan
(including Southern Sudan), four each in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Guinea, three
each in Afghanistan, Chad, Myanmar and the Republic
of the Congo, and one each in Burundi, Liberia, the
Central African Republic, Haiti, Somalia, Angola and
Zimbabwe. The aetiologic agents included Vibrio cho-
lerae (2), Plasmodium falciparum malaria (3), Neisseria
meningitidis (2), measles virus (3), hepatitis E virus (2),
Shigella dysenteriae type 1 (1), Leishmania donovani
(1), yellow fever virus (7), dengue virus (1), Ebola virus
(3), unspecified viral haemorrhagic fever (1), scurvy (1),
Marburg virus (1), Escherichia coli (1), influenza virus
(1), Yersinia pestis (1), Tunga penetrans (1), Gnathos-
toma spinigerum (1), monkeypox virus (1), Rift Valley
fever virus (1), West Nile virus, Salmonella typhi (1),
and Borrelia spp. (1).
Of the 58 reports included in the review, 20 were pri-
marily authored by the World Health Organization; 14
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Event Definition
Onset For diseases of which one case constitutes a potential outbreak, the date of onset of symptoms of the primary case.
For diseases that are normally endemic but are considered epidemic when an unusual increase in burden is observed, the date on
which the outbreak threshold was crossed, according to the authors.
If investigation revealed previous undetected outbreaks of the same health event, this was also noted.
Detection The date a report of a possible outbreak was sent to the highest appropriate level of authority. This could be the date of initial
detection, if no authorities were required to be notified.
Confirmation The date on which the aetiologic agent of the outbreak was confirmed.
Investigation The date an investigation team arrived to the outbreak-affected community.
Declaration The date the outbreak was officially declared as such by health authorities of the country concerned.
Control The first day of a reactive vaccination campaign (we only computed the date of this event for diseases for which vaccination was the
main control intervention available, since the date of implementation of other control interventions, such as water and sanitation, is
difficult to define).
Figure 1 Search strategy flowchart.
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Page 3 of 10by Médecins Sans Frontières; six by journalists; five by
international research institutes; three by national
research institutes; three by the United States Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention; two by overseas
governments; two by other NGOs; two by UNICEF; and
one by the national government.
Mode of detection of outbreaks
Among the 35 outbreaks for which mode of detection
information was available, 20 (57.1%) were detected
through existing surveillance systems, with 10 detected by
data analysis (Table 2) and 10 by formal notification
(Table 3). Fifteen outbreaks (42.9%) were initially detected
through informal notifications (Table 4). For three further
outbreaks (yellow fever virus in Guinea, Bounouma sub-
prefecture, August 2008 [16]; Salmonella typhi in central
Myanmar, September 2000 [17]; Borrelia spp. relapsing
fever in Southern Sudan, 2000 [18]), the mode of detection
was unclear, but time to detection was available: these are
included in the timeliness findings (see below).
Reports suggested that data analysis proved successful
when there was frequent reporting and analysis of data,
and with the provision of a free and dependable supply
of medication (outbreaks 2, 8). Poor reporting practices
delayed detection (outbreak 9). In two instances failures
were compensated for by informal notifications after
substantial delays (outbreaks 25, 35).
For both data analysis and formal notifications, limited
access to and distrust of health services delayed detec-
t i o n( o u t b r e a k s6 ,7 ,8 ,1 9 ) .I nt w oi n s t a n c e s ,w a r n i n g s
provided by a geographic information system and detec-
tion of an outbreak amongst local wildlife led to
enhanced surveillance and eventually detection (out-
breaks 16, 33).
Informal notifications originated from a local non-gov-
ernmental organisation (NGO) (outbreak 27), a research
Table 2 Details on outbreaks detected through data analysis (n = 10)
ID Country, area, date of onset
(references)
Aetiologic
agent
Onset to
detection
(days)
Comments
1 Afghanistan, Kabul, May 2005
[19]
Vibrio
cholerae
Increased case numbers reported through sentinel surveillance system. A low
mortality was attributed to the rapid activation of the surveillance system and
a rapid response.
2 Burundi, Kayanza Province, Sep
2000 [20-22]
Plasmodium
falciparum
(11) Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) initially noticed a doubling of caseloads over
the previous week and compared incidence to previous 3 years. The outbreak
was not confirmed until seroprevalence tests were performed in week 7 of
the epidemic.
3 Chad, Logone Occidental
Province, Feb 2000 [23,24]
Neisseria
meningitidis
Annual peaks of meningococcal meningitis are noted in this region.
4 Chad, Koumra district, Jan 2001
[24]
Neisseria
meningitidis
No further details were available.
5 DRC, Kinshasa, Jan 2002 [25] Measles virus The outbreak was detected by a sentinel surveillance system. Detection was
through both trend analysis and reports from health facilities not included in
the system. During the outbreak there were significant delays in reporting
from health districts. Limited population movement within the city delayed
spread of the epidemic. Early reactive vaccination of unaffected districts could
have averted many cases.
6 Sudan, Mornay village and camp,
West Darfur, Jul 2004 [26-28]
Hepatatis E
virus
The population of Mornay had recently increased due to the arrival of tens of
thousands of internally displaced persons. Security concerns and a lack of
confidence in Western medicine may have delayed detection. The local
hospital became overwhelmed. Cases were reported to the EWARN system.
7 Sudan, northern Sudan, Oct 2003
[29]
Measles virus Detection was extremely late, almost once the outbreak was over. The
investigation pointed to ongoing underreporting of measles by existing
surveillance systems in Sudan. Poor access to health-care facilities may be a
strong contributing factor.
8 Sudan, Aweil East county
(Southern Sudan), Jun 2003 [20]
Plasmodium
falciparum
(7) MSF reported an alert after quadrupling of cases. Historical comparisons were
hampered by changes in diagnostic strategies and reduced health care
utilisation rates due to flooding. Weekly reporting and analysis, and a free and
steady supply of anti-malarials may have favoured early detection.
9 Sudan, Abou Shouk camp, North
Darfur, Jun 2004 [30]
Shigella
dysenteriae
type 1
46 In the early stages of camp administration, there was poor reporting of
diseases. An emergency meeting was held to discuss the number of
diarrhoea cases being seen in therapeutic feeding centres and at camp
clinics. The WHO’s EWARN system verified the outbreak.
10 Sudan, Southern Sudan, Sep
2002 [31-33]
Leishmania
donovani
Recently internally displaced populations had poor access to health care.
Cases were carried on stretchers for days to receive treatment.
* Investigation revealed previously undetected or undiagnosed outbreaks; () indicates that dates were estimated.
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radio operator (outbreak 21), a rumour received by the
WHO (outbreak 33), international NGOs (outbreaks 22,
25, 31, 34), national hospital staff (outbreaks 23, 24, 28,
32). Again, treatment charges and limited access to health
facilities delayed detection (outbreaks 25, 27). Four out-
breaks occurring within isolated rural communities were
associated with late detections (outbreaks 21, 22, 29, 34).
Timeliness of detection and other events
Overall, the median lag time from onset to detection
was 29 days (range 7-80) in 16 outbreaks for which this
information was available. In two cases, investigation
also unveiled previously undetected and undiagnosed
outbreaks due to the same agent. Outbreaks detected
through informal notifications appeared to feature the
longest detection delays (Figure 2).
From the date of detection, further median (range)
delays were 7 days (0-30) to investigation, 23 (5-42) to
confirmation, 30 (15-50) to declaration and 55 (26-154)
to start of control (reactive vaccination). Numbers were
small and no obvious pattern emerged according to the
aetiologic agent’s route of transmission (Figure 3), but
long delays were obvious for some vector-borne disease
outbreaks.
Considering the time since reported onset of the out-
break, delays were longer: 42 days (8-87) to investigation
in nine outbreaks for which both time to detection and
time from detection to investigation were available; 53
(14-71, five outbreaks) to confirmation; 56 (36-61, three
outbreaks) to declaration; and 80 (78-86, three out-
breaks) to control.
Early warning alert and response network (EWARN)
systems set up in southern Sudan and Darfur in 2000
Table 3 Details on outbreaks detected through formal notifications (n = 10)
ID Country, area, date of onset
(references)
Aetiologic
agent
Onset to
detection
(days)
Comments
11 Guinea, Dinguiraye prefecture,
Oct 2004 [34]
Yellow fever
virus
In 2002 an African network of laboratories for the diagnosis of yellow fever
was developed, leading to far greater testing of acute jaundice cases.
12 Guinea, Kissidougou district,
Jun 2006 [35]
Yellow fever
virus
A yellow fever vaccination campaign had been conducted in this district, with
reported coverage of 93%. Only one case of yellow fever was identified. Close
surveillance was to be maintained but a mass vaccination campaign was not
considered necessary.
13 Guinea, Faranah health district,
Dec 2008 [36]
Yellow fever
virus
60 Two cases of yellow fever were initially reported through the yellow fever
surveillance system. A further 21 suspected cases were recorded. A targeted
mass reactive vaccination campaign was planned.
14 Liberia, Feb 2004 [34] Yellow fever
virus
42 cases of yellow fever were notified from eight of the country’s fifteen
counties.
15 Myanmar, Yangon, 2001 [37] Dengue virus Dengue is endemic in Myanmar. Outbreaks occur cyclically but this outbreak
was the largest on record.
16 Republic of Congo, Mbomo
and Kelle, Jan 2003 [38-40]
Ebola virus (34) In early January 2003, a WHO team arrived in the area to reactivate surveillance
and reinforce hygiene promotion, following detection of a zootic among
primates. A human outbreak was notified to the Ministry of Health and WHO
15 days later, 7 days after the index case was admitted to hospital. Control
efforts were hampered by difficulties in communication and transport.
Difficulties with community acceptance were also reported, including strong
cultural objections to the collection of blood and post-mortem skin samples,
delaying outbreak confirmation.
17 Sudan, Southern Sudan, 2000
[18]
Viral
haemorrhagic
fever
(7) A local team from the southern Sudan EWARN detected and reported the
case. Test results were available within 2 weeks of the reported onset.
18 Sudan, Torit County (Southern
Sudan), May 2003 [41,42]
Yellow fever
virus
A Norwegian NGO reported the suspected outbreak through the Southern
Sudan EWARN system.
19 Sudan, South Kordofan state,
Oct 2005 [43]
Yellow fever
virus
(30) A sentinel surveillance system of hospitals and clinics was in place. Jaundice
cases were reported promptly by state health officers through the central
surveillance system, but yellow fever was not initially considered and the
outbreak was initially attributed to dengue. Laboratory investigation was not
initially pursued. Confirmation and the start of control occurred more than a
month after notification.
20 Sudan, Yambio county,
Southern Sudan, May 2004
[44-47]
Ebola virus 21 Surveillance using haemorrhagic fever case definitions and a rapid response
through EWARN contributed to a small number of cases. A concomitant
measles outbreak complicated case identification, hampering control measures.
On site laboratory facilities could have prevented this.
* Investigation revealed previously undetected or undiagnosed outbreaks; () indicates that dates were estimated.
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ID Country, area, date of onset
(references)
Aetiologic
agent
Onset to
detection
(days)
Comments
21 Afghanistan, Bamian, Sep 2000
[48]
Plasmodium
falciparum
* A United Nations radio operator notified the alert. A similar outbreak had
occurred undetected two to three years earlier.
22 Afghanistan, Taiwara District,
Mar 2002 [49]
Scurvy (46) Isolation of the district during the winter months delayed detection. The
outbreak was reported by an international NGO.
23 Angola, Uige Province, Mar
2005 [50-58]
Marburg virus * Concerns of an unusual severe illness were raised by hospital staff in October
2004. A poliomyelitis surveillance officer carried out the initial case
investigation in November. Blood samples were sent for analysis at the CDC.
Results were initially negative for any viral haemorrhagic fever. Low numbers
of similar cases occurred over subsequent months. By 9 March 2005 the
situation worsened, and the first death among health care staff occurred. New
blood sampling confirmed Marburg on 21 March 2005. Travel by road was
precarious, necessitating air transport. Retrospective analysis identified 102
cases dating back to October 2003. Fear and poor adherence to infection
control procedures hampered control.
24 Central African Republic, Bangui,
Jul 2002 [59]
Hepatitis E
virus
A government chief medical officer reported people with jaundice dying of
haemorrhage. Yellow fever was initially suspected. Investigation revealed
symptoms suggestive of hepatitis. Laboratory tests confirmed Hepatitis E.
25 Chad, Jun 2005 [60] Measles virus A senior vaccination officer with MSF noticed a high incidence of measles
being reported from health clinics, during a site visit. A surveillance system
was in place, but the data were not being analysed.
26 DRC, Kinshasa, Jun 2003 [61] Escherichia
coli
An informal alert was raised by the Institut National de Recherche Biomedicale
in Kinshasa in response to an increasing incidence of severe diarrhoea testing
positive for E coli. An outbreak investigation could not be conducted at the
time due to political unrest. A high case-fatality amongst infants at a city
hospital was attributed to insufficient treatment, particularly haemodialysis, at
the beginning of the outbreak.
27 DRC, Bosobolo district, Equateur
Province, Nov 2002 [62]
Influenza
virus
80 A local NGO reported the outbreak. The area was under the control of a rebel
group. The public had little access to medical facilities. A large proportion of
deaths could have been prevented with antibiotics.
28 DRC, Orientale Province, Jan
2005 [63]
Yersinia pestis (28) An informal alert of an epidemic, initially thought to be of haemorrhagic
fever, was notified by local health providers in a camp for diamond miners.
29 Haiti, Petites Montagnes, 2004
[64]
Tunga
penetrans
Health care facilities were up to 20 hours’ walk away and at times
unreachable. Clinical staff became aware of the outbreak relatively late, after
receiving news brought by community health workers.
30 Myanmar, Yangon, 2001 [65] Gnathostoma
spinigerum
The outbreak occurred amongst Korean immigrants. The alert was raised by
the Korean Embassy.
31 Republic of Congo, Mbomo,
Nov 2003 [66,67]
Ebola virus 24 Red Cross volunteers informed local health authorities of a rumour of four
suspicious deaths. A week later, a regional investigation team notified an alert
of viral haemorrhagic fever to the central level. Impassable roads delayed the
response team’s arrival by 4 days. The response team was blamed for people
dying and for bringing the disease. There was fear of isolation centres and at-
home isolation kits were experimented with.
32 Republic of Congo, Impfondo,
Likouala district, Jun 2003 [68]
Monkeypox
virus
(65) A physician treated several patients with pox-like lesions over a period of 3
weeks. Alarmed by the severity of the more recent cases, he sent
photographs to colleagues from a city hospital of whom one was invited to
assist with diagnosis and control. A week later, the outbreak was reported to
the CDC and US embassy.
33 Somalia, Afmadow district,
Lower Juba Region, Dec 2006
[69]
Rift Valley
fever virus
In November 2006, warnings were issued of possible Rift Valley Fever
outbreaks, following predictions by spatial models. On 19 December, the WHO
received reports of suspected cases in Somalia. Violence, and later also a
Kenyan border closure substantially delayed investigation. The virus was
laboratory confirmed on 20 January. WHO’s outbreak response teams in
Nairobi worked closely with poliomyelitis surveillance officers and MSF in
Somalia to investigate. Somali medical officers were provided with training on
diagnosis and control by the WHO. Security deteriorations further hampered
control efforts.
34 Sudan, Nuba mountains, South
Kordofan state, 2002 [70]
West Nile
virus
MSF operated the only health clinic available in the area, and notified the
alert. Cases came from villages up to 8 hours’ walk away.
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outbreaks. These outbreaks generally featured the short-
est times from onset through to confirmation (outbreaks
6, 9, 17, 18, 20, 38).
Cooperation by communities was greatly hampered by
fear and distrust of control teams and biomedical inter-
ventions during investigations of Ebola virus and Mar-
burg virus outbreaks (outbreaks 16, 23, 31). Other
obstacles to investigation included poor road conditions
and insecurity (outbreaks 31, 26, 33). On two occasions,
misconceptions by authorities and subsequently late
investigations significantly delayed confirmation of cau-
sative agents (outbreaks 2, 19).
Discussion and conclusions
This review suggests that over the last decade surveillance
systems have played a considerable role in early outbreak
detection in the 22 fragile states included in the review.
However, on the whole data analysis seemed to lead to a
minority of outbreak detections, with both formal and
informal notifications of alerts playing a more prominent,
though less timely role. Certain elements of the system
played an important role in sensitivity and timeliness,
including reduced barriers to health facility utilisation and
frequent data analysis. Combining knowledge of the seaso-
nal outbreak risks particular to each area with predictive
tools such as geographic information systems could be
used to improve the effectiveness of such systems. More
importantly, surveillance systems in fragile states should
enhance the detection of alerts outside routine data analy-
sis, by focussing more efforts on building both formal and
informal networks of informants, particularly where acute
emergency conditions or remoteness prevent sophisticated
data collection and analysis.
Our review suggested that timeliness of detection,
investigation and response is poor for most outbreaks
occurring in fragile states, with up to five months elap-
sing until the start of meaningful control. These delays
negate most of the advantages of surveillance and make
containment extremely difficult.
Our review is limited by our search strategy, which
did not capture outbreaks described in the grey litera-
ture. Furthermore, findings may not apply to other
states that met fragility criteria for only some of the
years within the review’s timeframe. Publication bias is
likely to influence our findings, but its direction is
Table 4 Details on outbreaks detected through informal notifications (n = 15) (Continued)
35 Zimbabwe, Aug 2008 [71-73] Vibrio
cholerae
Due to collapsing health services, surveillance system completeness was
estimated at 30%. The initial recognition of the epidemic was an increased
number of cases of ‘watery diarrhoea’ being noted by Municipal Health
Clinics. The ability of the Public Health Laboratory to confirm cholera was
greatly limited by shortages of manpower and resources resulting from
economic crisis. A second wave of the epidemic from Oct 2008 spread to all
provinces and neighbouring countries. The Zimbabwean government
declared an epidemic in Dec 2008.
* Investigation revealed previously undetected or undiagnosed outbreaks; () indicates that dates were estimated.
Figure 2 Delay in days from onset to detection in 15 outbreaks, by mode of detection.
Bruckner and Checchi Conflict and Health 2011, 5:13
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/5/1/13
Page 7 of 10difficult to gauge: while large outbreaks that were inten-
sively investigated and controlled are more likely to be
the subject of publications, small outbreaks that were
detected early and contained are probably under-
reported. We noted that the vast majority of reports
included were authored by institutions based outside the
affected countries, with only one report coming from the
national ministry of health. This suggests a need to
strengthen capacity by fragile states to communicate out-
break surveillance findings, so as to promote ownership
of surveillance and outbreak control, and raise the profile
of outbreaks and epidemic-prone diseases that interna-
tional counterparts would not otherwise respond to.
During data abstraction, the considerable heterogene-
ity of formats and variables included in outbreak reports
was apparent. We recommend that a more standardised
format be introduced for papers reporting outbreaks,
particularly affecting vulnerable populations; and that
key meta-data such as the dates of salient events in the
outbreak timeline and the circumstances of detection
always be reported, so as to enable ongoing global mon-
itoring of the effectiveness of surveillance systems and
outbreak control interventions.
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